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LOUISIANA
Keith B. Hall†
I. LEGISLATION AMENDS LOUISIANA MINERAL CODE ARTICLE 212.21
Act No. 227 of the 2020 Regular Session of the Louisiana
Legislature amends Louisiana Mineral Code article 212.21 (also
known as Louisiana Revised Statutes 31:212.21).1 In particular, Act
No. 227 amends article 212.21 to clarify that the article does not apply
to claims brought by unleased owners—that is, landowners2 or mineral
servitude3 owners whose mineral interests are not under lease.
DOI: https://doi.org/10.37419/JPL.V7.I3.5
†
Keith B. Hall is the Campanile Charities Professor of Energy Law at Louisiana
State University, where he also serves as Director of the Mineral Law Institute and
Director of the John P. Laborde Energy Law Center. Professor Hall teaches courses
such as Mineral Rights; International Petroleum Transactions; Energy Law and
Regulation; and Civil Law Property. Before joining LSU, he practiced law at a major
firm in New Orleans, where he served as Co-Chair of the firm’s Energy Law Practice
Group.
1. H.B. 227, 2020 Reg. Sess. (La. 2020).
2. H.B. 227, 2020 Reg. Sess. (La. 2020). In Louisiana, as in the rest of the
United States, the general rule is that the landowner owns the right to use the land
and its subsurface to explore for and produce oil and gas, and to own whatever oil
and gas he or she produces, assuming that the landowner or a predecessor-in-interest
has not granted that right to someone else. See LA. REV. STAT. 31:6.
3. Louisiana does not recognize the concept of a severed mineral estate. See
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To understand this amendment and its significance, it is helpful to
know a little about Mineral Code articles 212.21 through 212.23.
These articles were enacted in a 1982 amendment to the Louisiana
Mineral Code.4 The articles are patterned on Mineral Code articles
137 through 140—a portion of the original Mineral Code that governs
claims by a mineral lessor who seeks relief from the lessee for a failure
“to make timely or proper payment of royalties” due under the lease.
The articles establish certain procedures as a prerequisite for lessors
asserting a claim, such as providing written notice to the lessee and
waiting at least thirty days after delivery of such notice before filing
suit.5 In certain circumstances, articles 139 and 140 also authorize a
court to enter a judgment including enhanced remedies that are greater
than the royalties due, such as judgments requiring the payment of
interest, attorney’s fees, and “damages” up to “double the amount of
royalties due.”6
Articles 212.21 through 212.23 were enacted to establish a similar
procedure and to authorize similar enhanced remedies for claims by
“the owner of a mineral production payment or a royalty owner other
than a mineral lessor . . . for the failure of a mineral lessee to make
timely or proper payment of royalties or the production payment.”
Article 212.21 requires that such a person “must give his obligor
written notice of such failure as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for
damages.” Article 212.22 provides that “[t]he obligor shall have thirty
days after receipt of the required notice within which to pay the
royalties or production payments due or to respond by stating in
writing a reasonable cause for nonpayment.” Article 212.23 then
specifies the consequences if the obligor does neither of these things.
In some circumstances, the consequences require the obligor pay
interest, attorney’s fees, and “damages double the amount due.”
Frost-Johnson Lumber Co. v. Salling’s Heirs, 91 So. 207, 245 (La. 1922); Wemple
v. Nabors Oil and Gas Co., 97 So. 666, 668–69 (La. 1923). However, a landowner
may grant a mineral servitude in favor of another person. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:24
(1975). A mineral servitude, while it exists, is somewhat like a severed mineral
estate. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:21 (1975) (“A mineral servitude is the right of enjoyment
of land belonging to another for the purpose of exploring for and producing minerals
and reducing them to possession and ownership.”). The major practical distinction
between a severed mineral estate and a mineral servitude is that a severed mineral
estate may constitute a permanent severance of mineral rights from land ownership,
but a mineral servitude terminates if it is not used for any period of ten consecutive
years. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27 (1975). (“A mineral servitude is extinguished by …
prescription resulting from nonuse for ten years … “).
4. Acts 1982, No. 249, § 1, LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:212.21–23 (1982).
5. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:137 (1975).
6. See LA. REV. STAT. §§ 31:139–140 (1975).
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Sometimes parties dispute whether a landowner or mineral
servitude owner whose interest in minerals in a compulsory drilling
unit is unleased can utilize these statutes. The statutes, as noted above,
apply in favor of “the owner of a mineral production payment or a
royalty owner other than a mineral lessor.” A landowner or mineral
servitude owner would not seem to qualify as “a royalty owner other
than a mineral lessor.” The word “royalty” is used in three main ways.
First, under oil and gas leases, the mineral lessor is owed a lessor’s
royalty,7 but a landowner or mineral servitude owner whose interest is
not leased would not be entitled to a lessor’s royalty under an oil and
gas lease. Second, Mineral Code article 80 defines “mineral royalty”
as a right that is carved out of a landowner’s or mineral servitude
owner’s interest in minerals in favor of some other person.8 Third,
persons in the oil and gas industry sometimes establish an “overriding
royalty,” which is an interest that is carved out of the mineral lessee’s
interest.9 Obviously, if no lease covers the landowner’s or mineral
servitude owner’s interest, there will not be a mineral lessee from
whose working interest an overriding royalty can be carved.
That left only the possibility that a landowner or mineral servitude
owner could be the owner of a “mineral production payment.” The
Mineral Code does not define “mineral production payment,” but
“production payment” is commonly used in the oil and gas industry to
refer to a person’s right to receive a fraction of the value of production,
free of costs, with the interest carved out of the lessee’s interest.10
Used this way, the term “production payment” has a meaning similar
to “overriding royalty.” However, once an overriding royalty is
established, it typically lasts for the life of the lease, but a “production
payment” often terminates automatically once the owner of it has
recovered a specified amount of money.11
There is a strong argument that this was the appropriate meaning of
“production payment” for purposes of article 212.21.12 If such a
meaning is applied for purposes of Mineral Code article 212.1, the
7. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:213 (1983).
8. See LA. REV. STAT. § 31:80 (1975).
9. See, e.g., id. § 31:126 cmt. (referring to overriding royalties as being carved
out of the “working interest,” which is the lessee’s right to conduct operations under
a lease).
10. See, e.g., PATRICK H. MARTIN & BRUCE M. KRAMER, WILLIAMS & MEYERS
MANUAL OF OIL AND GAS TERMS 1396 (17th ed. 2018)1 (definition of “production
payment”).
11. Id. at 1233, 1396 (definition of “overriding royalty”).
12. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 11 (1988) (“Words of art and technical terms must be
given their technical meaning when the law involves a technical matter.”).
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owner of an unleased interest would not be the owner of a mineral
production payment. Two federal courts interpreted the statute this
way, holding that unleased owners were not entitled to use Mineral
Code article 212.21.13 Act No. 227 revises Mineral Code article
212.21 to codify the holdings of these federal cases that articles 212.21
through 212.23 do not apply to an unleased landowner’s or mineral
servitude owner’s right to a share of unit production. The
pre-amendment language of article 212.21 states:
If the owner of a mineral production payment or a
royalty owner other than a mineral lessor seeks relief
for the failure of a mineral lessee to make timely or
proper payment of royalties or the production payment,
he must give his obligor written notice of such failure
as a prerequisite to a judicial demand for damages.
The amendment removed “mineral” from the phrase “mineral
production payment” and added the phrase “created out of a mineral
lessee’s interest” as follows:
If the owner of a mineral production payment created
out of a mineral lessee’s interest or a royalty owner
other than a mineral lessor seeks relief for the failure of
a mineral lessee to make timely or proper payment of
royalties or the production payment, he must give his
obligor written notice of such failure as a prerequisite
to a judicial demand for damages.14
The change is significant because “production payment” is commonly
understood as being an interest carved out of the lessee’s interest.
Further, the addition of the phrase “created out of a mineral lessee’s
interest” expressly provides for this meaning and therefore precludes
article 212.21’s application to an unleased owner’s right to a share of
unit production.

13. Adams v. Chesapeake Operating Co., 561 Fed. Appx. 322, 326 (5th Cir.
2014); J&L Family, L.L.C. v. BHP Billiton Petroleum Props., 293 F. Supp. 3d 615,
620 (W.D. La. 2018).
14. H.B. 227, Reg. Sess. (La. 2020).
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II. LOUISIANA’S OFFICE OF CONSERVATION SIGNIFICANTLY IMPROVES
MANAGEMENT OF ACTIVE & ORPHAN WELLS15
In 2014, the Louisiana Legislative Auditor (the “Auditor”) issued a
report on the management of active and orphan wells16 by Louisiana’s
Office of Conservation (“Conservation”).17 The Auditor concluded
that: (1) Conservation was not conducting a sufficient number of
inspections of wells; (2) there were too many wells for which
Conservation did not require financial assurance (security to ensure
wells are properly plugged and abandonded at the end of the wells’
lives); (3) when financial assurance was required, that the amount
often was too low; and (4) Conservation lacked an effective program
for dealing with operators’ failures to comply with regulations.18 The
Auditor made twenty-one recommendations.19
In March 2020, the Auditor released a follow-up report that
examined Conservation’s progress toward complying with the
recommendations the Auditor made in 2014.20 The Auditor found that
Conservation had fully or partially implemented all twenty-one
recommendations.21 For example, the fraction of wells that
Conservation requires financial assurance increased from 25% to
66.3% of wells, and Conservation increased the amount of financial
assurance required.22 Conservation improved its inspection process
and developed procedures that specify when the agency should issue
compliance orders and impose penalties for active wells that fail
15. See generally LA. STAT. ANN. § 30:4 (2018) (explaining that the Office of
Conservation regulates oil and gas activities in Louisiana); see infra note 20, at 6.
16. See
LA.
DEPT.
NAT.
RES.,
Glossary
of
Terms,
http://www.sonris.com/documents/FinalLouisianaDNRGlossaryofTerm.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z5DU-XZQW], (defining “orphan wells” as “[w]ells which have
no continued useful purpose for the exploration, production, or development of oil
and gas and which have been declared to be an orphaned oilfield site under R.S.
30:91,” with this designation being declared pursuant to 30:91 when non financially
responsible party with liability for the well can be found).
17. Daryl G. Purpera, Oil and Gas Regulation and Orphaned Wells: Office of
Conservation – Dept. of Nat. Res., LA. LEGIS. AUDITOR (May 28, 2014) [hereinafter
“2014 Report”], https://www.lla.la.gov/PublicReports.nsf/D6A0EBE279B83B9F8
6257CE700506EAD/$FILE/000010BC.pdf [https://perma.cc/8A4Y-4ES6].
18. Id. at 2.
19. Id. at 6–28.
20. Daryl G. Purpera, Progress Report: Regulation of Oil and Gas Wells and
Management of Orphaned Wells: Office of Conservation – Dept. of Nat. Res., LA.
LEGIS. AUDITOR (Mar. 11, 2020) [hereinafter “2020 Report”],
http://app.lla.state.la.us/PublicReports.nsf/0/C9D7297FEA93568D86258528006B
A4F8/$FILE/0001FA2E.pdf [https://perma.cc/T7BQ-H6WG].
21. Id. at 1.
22. Id. at 2.
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inspection. The procedures also specify when Conservation should
conduct a re-inspection.23 Further, Conservation amended its
regulations to ensure that operators schedule the plugging and
abandonment of inactive wells that have no future utility, rather than
delaying the plugging and abandonment by stating the wells have
future utility.24
However, the Auditor found that the Conservation’s management
of wells should be improved further. For example, although the
Conservation increased the amount of financial assurance required,
that amount was still below the typical cost to plug and abandon a
well.25 The Auditor found that, in 2019, the average cost to plug and
abandon an onshore well less than 3,000 feet deep was about $4.76
per foot but that the required financial assurance was only $2 per
foot.26 The average cost to plug and abandon deeper, onshore wells
was approximately $35.84 per foot but that the required financial
assurance was $4 per foot.27 In addition, the Auditor found that the
Conservation was not conducting enough re-inspections.28
III. APPELLATE COURT AFFIRMS JUDGMENT REGARDING WHETHER
DRILLING WAS PERFORMED IN GOOD FAITH
In June 1996, Thomas Blount sold land to Cannisnia Plantation,
LLC (“Cannisnia”), reserving a mineral servitude for one-half of all
the oil and gas produced from the land.29 Mr. Blount later transferred
the servitude to Blount Farms, LLC, which transferred it to Blount
Company. Blount Company eventually transferred the servitude back
to Blount Farms.30 This Article will refer to Mr. Blount, his father,
Blount Farms, and Blount Company collectively as “the Blounts.”
The Blounts apparently had no previous oil and gas experience, but
they wanted to drill their own well. They hired an experienced
geologist who developed a plan to drill a well through multiple
potentially productive formations. The Blounts also consulted with
other geologists, hired a drilling contractor, and obtained a permit to
drill. They spudded the Cannisnia-Blount No. 1 well in March 2006
23. Id.
24. Id. at 3.
25. Id. at 2.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. Cannisnia Plantation, LLC v. Cecil Blount Farms, LLC, 293 So. 3d 157, 160
(La. Ct. App. 2020).
30. Id.
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and reached its total depth in April 2006. (In certain places in the
opinion, the court erroneously refers to drilling or other operations
occurring in “2016,” but the context of the reference indicates that the
events occurred in 2006.) They logged the well and collected a core
sample. The well was a dry hole, and the Blounts plugged it.
Several years later, in early November 2014, Cannisnia sent notice
to the Blounts, demanding (pursuant to Mineral Code article 206) that
the Blounts furnish a recordable instrument stating that their servitude
had terminated. The Blounts did not do so. In December 2014,
Cannisnia filed suit seeking a declaratory judgment that the servitude
had terminated, plus attorney fees and damages for the Blounts’ failure
to acknowledge that the servitude had terminated. The Blounts
answered and filed a reconventional demand in which they sought a
declaratory judgment that the servitude had not terminated.
Under Louisiana law, nonuse extinguishes a mineral servitude.31
Prescription of nonuse is interrupted by “good faith” drilling.32 For
drilling to be in “good faith” for purposes of Mineral Code article 29,
the drilling “must be . . . commenced with reasonable expectation of
discovering and producing minerals in paying quantities at a particular
point or depth,” and the drilling must be “continued at the site chosen
to that point or depth.”33 When a landowner contends that a mineral
servitude has terminated, the owner of the servitude has the burden of
proving that there was an interruption of prescription.34
At trial, four of the geologists with whom the Blounts had consulted
gave testimony, stating that they believed there had been a reasonable
expectation that the Blounts would find hydrocarbons in paying
quantities at the depth they drilled.35 The evidence shows that the
Blounts incurred about $160,000 in drilling expenses.36 The trial court
entered judgment, holding that the servitude had not terminated.37
Cannisnia appealed.38
The Louisiana Second Circuit noted that prior Louisiana court
decisions considered numerous factors in determining whether drilling
was done in “good faith.” The court stated:
31. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:27(1); see also Cannisnia, 293 So. 3d at 170.
32. LA. REV. STAT. § 31:29; see also Cannisnia, 293 So. 3d at 170.
33. Id.
34. Cannisnia, 293 So. 3d at 168 (citing Smith v. Andrews, 215 So. 3d 868 (La.
Ct. App. 2017)).
35. Id. at 167.
36. Id. at 167, 172.
37. Id. at 167.
38. Id.
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Some of these factors include the geology of the
drilling site and surrounding area based upon prior
wells and seismic data; the expertise and experience of
the geologists, petroleum engineers, and oil men
making the recommendations and decisions; the depth
of review of the available geology; the timing of the
lease and its terms; the expenses incurred in the
operation; the permit applications; the various types of
testing performed; the analysis of formations
encountered during drilling; the keeping of well logs;
the time put into drilling; the depth drilled; and the size
of pipes used. This nonexclusive list, along with the
credibility assessment of testimony given at trial, is to
be weighed by the trial court in making the good faith
determination.39
The Second Circuit affirmed the trial court’s judgment.40 The
appellate court noted that the trial court’s written reasons included a
reference to Cannisnia not proving their case, but the appellate court
concluded that this did not require reversal. It was not clear that the
trial court had really placed the burden of proof on Cannisnia.41
Further, when parties appeal, they appeal judgments, not the reasons
for judgment, and here the record contained sufficient evidence to
justify affirming the lower court’s judgment.42 In affirming the lower
court’s judgment, the appellate court rejected suggestions that the
Blounts’ sole reason for drilling the well was to interrupt
prescription.43
In his dissent, Judge Thompson expressed his opinion that the
record did not contain sufficient evidence to show that the Blounts
satisfied Louisiana’s objective standard for good faith, which requires
a reasonable expectation of finding hydrocarbons in paying quantities,
not merely a subjective belief that a well will produce hydrocarbons.44

39. Id. at 171 (citing Indigo Minerals, LLC v. Pardee Minerals, LLC, 37 So. 3d
1122, 1131 (La. Ct. App. 2010)).
40. Id. at 172.
41. Id. at 168.
42. Id. at 172.
43. Id. (“If the Blounts’ sole concern was the interruption of prescription, they
could have drilled a shallower well and spent less time and money drilling.”).
44. Id. at 172–73.
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IV. LIENS INVALID UNDER LOUISIANA OIL WELL LIEN ACT
PADCO Energy Services, LLC and PADCO Pressure Control, LLC
(collectively, “PADCO”) were companies that built “flowback units,”
which are used at well sites during flowback—when hydraulic
fracturing fluids are returning from the well bore.45 PADCO’s primary
business was to rent these units to companies that worked on well
completions.46 Case Energy Services, LLC (“Case”) sold piping and
gauges to PADCO.47 Case delivered these items to PADCO’s place of
business, and PADCO incorporated these items into the flowback
units.48
A dispute arose between PADCO and Case. Case filed suit in state
court, alleging that PADCO did not pay the full price for the use of
certain flowback units. Case also filed twenty-five liens in Louisiana
pursuant to the Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act (“LOWLA”).49 In
addition, Case filed ten liens in Texas based on a Texas statute. Each
of the PADCO entities later entered bankruptcy, and Case’s state court
action was stayed. PADCO filed adversary proceedings in the
bankruptcies, seeking judgments that Case’s liens were invalid.
PADCO sought summary judgment.
Under LOWLA, certain persons are entitled to a lien. These include
“contractors,” with “contractor” defined as a person who contracts to
perform “operations.”50 In turn, “operations” are defined to include
various types of work performed “on a well site.”51 The court
concluded that Case could not qualify as a “contractor” because it had
not contracted to perform work at a well site.
Persons who deliver movables to a well site can be entitled to a lien,
but Case did not deliver its equipment to a well site. Case delivered
the items to PADCO’s place of business.
In addition, under LOWLA, a person who sells movables to an
“operator” or “contractor” is entitled to a lien to secure payment of the
purchase price for the movables, provided the movables are
incorporated into the well, incorporated into a facility located on the
well site, consumed in operations, or consumed by a person
45. In re PADCO Energy Services, LLC v. Case Energy Services, LLC, 610
B.R. 96, 106 (Bankr. W.D. La. 2019).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 105.
48. Id.
49. The Louisiana Oil Well Lien Act is found at LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861–
9:4873 (2007).
50. LA. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:4861–9:4862 (2007).
51. Id. § 9:4861.
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performing work at the well site.52 Here, it was not clear that Case had
sold movables to an “operator” or “contractor” when it sold items to
PADCO. An “operator” is defined to mean a lessee who contracts with
the claimant. PADCO was not a lessee and therefore was not an
operator.
The court then considered whether PADCO was a contractor.53 To
be a “contractor” under LOWLA, a company must enter a contract to
perform work at a well site. PADCO’s main business was simply
renting equipment for use at a well site, not performing work at well
sites. If PADCO did not contract to perform work at the well site, it
would not be a contractor, and Case would not have a valid lien based
on selling movables to a contractor. But Case managed to raise a
genuine issue of fact regarding whether PADCO had agreed to
perform work at the well site, so the court could not grant summary
judgment based on PADCO not qualifying as a contractor.
However, for Case’s liens to be valid under LOWLA based on a
sale of movables to a contractor, the movables must have been
incorporated into the well, incorporated into a facility located on the
well site, consumed in operations, or consumed by a person
performing work on the well site. The court concluded that Case’s
liens did not satisfy this requirement. The piping and gauges sold by
Case were not consumed. Further, they were not incorporated into the
well. The movables sold by Case were incorporated into the flowback
units that were temporarily placed on the lease tract, but the court
concluded that this is not what was meant by Louisiana Revised
Statutes 9:4861’s reference to a “facility located on the well site.”
Therefore, PADCO was entitled to summary judgment because the
twenty-five liens that Case filed in Louisiana were invalid.54
The court stated that there was an additional, independent basis for
summary judgment in favor of PADCO regarding Case’s Louisiana
liens. In particular, the liens did not fairly apprise third persons of the
nature of the liens because: (1) each lien stated that PADCO owed
Case more than $1.2 million, but that amount was actually the total
amount allegedly owed to Case (the individual liens each secured a
much lower amount); and (2) the liens did not describe the work done
by Case. The court stated that these deficiencies made these liens
invalid.

52. Id. § 9:4862(A).
53. PADCO Energy Services, 610 B.R. at 106–07.
54. Id. at 114.
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V. WELL COST REPORTING STATUTE
B.A. Kelly Land Company, LLC (“Kelly”) was an owner of
unleased land in two compulsory drilling and production units.55
Aethon Energy became operator of the units in 2016.56 By then,
numerous wells had reached payout.57 As an unleased owner, Kelly
was entitled to its pro rata share of each well’s monthly revenue after
payout, subject to a deduction of Kelly’s pro rata share of ongoing
operating costs.58 Kelly sent multiple requests for information, and
Aethon sent reports to Kelly. Kelly complained that the reports did not
contain all the information Kelly was entitled to receive, but Aethon
did not correct the problem.59 In September 2018, Kelly filed suit
against Aethon based on Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:103.1 and
103.2.60
Revised Statute 30:103.1 provides that, when a compulsory drilling
unit includes any land “upon which the operator or producer has no
valid oil, gas, or mineral lease,” the owners of mineral interests in
those lands have a right to receive specified types of information
regarding costs and revenues from a unit well, though the statute has
been interpreted so that the mineral interest owner’s right to receive
the information does not arise until the owner requests such
information.61 Revised Statute 30:103.2 provides that, if an operator
fails to comply with 30:103.1, and the operator does not correct that
failure within ninety days after a mineral interest owner notifies the
operator of the failure, the operator loses their right to charge that for
the owner’s share of certain drilling costs.
Kelly alleged that Aethon’s reports failed to include the information
required under Louisiana Revised Statutes 30:103.1 and that, pursuant
to Revised Statute 30:103.2, the penalty for this failure was that
Aethon forfeited its right to collect Kelly’s pro rata share of the wells’
operating costs.62 The court disagreed, concluding that Kelly’s

55. B.A. Kelly Land Co., LLC v. Aethon Energy Operating LLC, No. 5:18-CV01243, 2019 WL 5021267, at *1 (W.D. La. Oct. 9, 2019).
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Id. at *1–2.
60. Id. at *2.
61. Id. at *3 (citing Adams v. Chesapeake Operating, Inc., 561 F. App’x 322,
325 (5th Cir. 2014)).
62. Id. at *2.
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correspondence was not sufficiently detailed to trigger liability under
the statute.63
VI. DUTY TO CORRECT INACCURATE PRODUCTION REPORTS
Statoil USA E&P, Inc. held an oil and gas lease on the Outer
Continental Shelf.64 In August 2010, the Office of Natural Resources
Revenue (“ONRR”) found “significant volume variances” when
comparing natural gas production information reported by Statoil to
information supplied by gas-plant operators.65 ONRR sent an order to
Statoil instructing the company to correct its reports within thirty
days.66 Statoil did not comply.67
ONRR contacted Statoil regarding the variances again in January
2011 and May 2011.68 Statoil acknowledged that its prior reports were
inaccurate, but it failed to correct them.69 In August 2011, ONRR
threatened to impose penalties for a “knowing or willful failure to
maintain accurate information.” Statoil still failed to correct its
reports.70
In February 2012, ONRR sent a notice of civil penalty to Statoil.71
ONRR relied on 30 U.S.C. § 17119(d), which authorizes the
imposition of a penalty against any person who “knowingly or
willfully prepares, maintains, or submits false, inaccurate, or
misleading reports, notices, affidavits, records, data, or other written
information.”72 ONRR stated that the penalty was imposed for a
“knowing and willful maintenance of incorrect information on gas
sales volumes reported.”73
Statoil challenged the penalty, arguing to an administrative law
judge that the company had not “maintained” inaccurate reports
because the reports were stored in ONRR’s online database.74 Thus,
ONRR had “maintained” the data; Statoil had not. The administrative
63. Id. at *7.
64. Statoil USA E&P, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, 801 F. Appx. 232, 235 (5th
Cir. 2020).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.; 30 U.S.C. § 17119(d)(1) (2012).
73. Statoil USA E&P, Inc., 801 F. App’x at 235.
74. Id.
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law judge rejected that argument.75 Statoil appealed to the Department
of Interior’s Board of Land Appeals, but the Board affirmed.76 Statoil
appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District
of Texas, but the district court affirmed.77 Statoil then appealed to the
United States Fifth Circuit.78
The Fifth Circuit also rejected Statoil’s arguments and affirmed.
The court noted that, in the Webster’s Third New International
Dictionary, one meaning of “maintain” is “to keep in a state of repair,
efficiency, or validity.”79 The court concluded that for purposes of 30
U.S.C. § 1719(d), a lessee must correct reports that they know are
false, inaccurate, or misleading to avoid liability for maintaining
inaccurate records.80 The court stated that it makes little sense to
interpret § 1719(d)’s sanctions for maintaining inaccurate records as
applying only when a company has physical possession of the
inaccurate information.81 Indeed, the Fifth Circuit stated, “In the
context of an online, record-keeping system, a distinction based on
physical possession makes even less sense.”82
VII. UNITED STATES FIFTH CIRCUIT AFFIRMS REMAND IN COASTAL
LAND LOSS LITIGATION
Several coastal parishes filed forty-two lawsuits in various
Louisiana state courts against numerous oil and gas companies,
alleging that the companies’ activities contributed to coastal land
loss.83 The defendants removed the lawsuits to federal courts based on
several legal theories, but the federal district courts remanded each
case.84 Later, after the plaintiffs submitted an expert report that
referred to certain oil and gas activities in the coastal regions during
World War II, the defendants removed the cases again, relying on the
“federal officer” removal statute.85 The statute authorizes removal by
any federal officer who is sued for actions that the defendant took as a
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
2020).
84.
85.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 233, 235.
Id.
Id. at 236.
Id.
Id. at 236–37.
Id.
See Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir.
Id.
Id. (The federal officer removal statute is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1442).
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federal officer.86 It also allows private defendants to remove a case if
they are sued for acts they took under direction of a federal officer.87
The defendants argued that they were working under the direction of
the federal Petroleum Administration for War during World War II.88
The United States District Courts for the Eastern and Western
Districts of Louisiana disagreed and remanded.89 The district courts
acknowledged that private individuals can use federal office removal
when they are sued for actions taken under the direction of federal
officers, but the courts stated that the mere fact that a defendant’s
activities are subject to federal regulation is not sufficient.90 The
courts reasoned that the defendants’ activities were not under
sufficient control and direction of a federal officer for the defendants
to be entitled to use federal officer removal.91
Further, if a defendant does not remove the case within thirty days
of the first paper that showed the case could be removed, the defendant
forfeits their right to remove.92 The defendants’ second removal of
some of the coastal land loss cases occurred within thirty days of the
plaintiffs submitting the expert report, but it was more than thirty days
since the plaintiffs had filed their original petitions.93 The plaintiffs
apparently argued that, even if the expert report provided additional
details, it was obvious from the plaintiffs’ original petitions that their
claims were based on activities that occurred over a period that
included World War II. Thus, the plaintiffs argued that the thirty-day
deadline ran from the date the original petition was served, not from
the time the expert report was submitted, and therefore a removal
based on the federal officer removal statute was not timely. The
86. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (2012).
87. See Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 540
(W.D. La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020).
88. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir.
2020).
89. Id. (The actions were filed in state courts in several parishes, some of which
are in the Eastern District and some of which are in the Western District).
90. Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 540–42
(W.D. La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020); Par. of Plaquemines v.
Chevron USA, Inc., 2019 WL 2271118, at *9 (E.D. La.), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th
Cir. 2020).
91. Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 546 (W.D.
La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020); Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA,
Inc., 2019 WL 2271118, at *17 (E.D. La.), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020).
92. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(3) (2012); Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc.,
969 F.3d 502, 506 (5th Cir. 2020).
93. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 507 (5th Cir.
2020).
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Western District rejected that argument,94 but the Eastern District
agreed with the defendants that the removal based on the federal
officer removal statute was not timely.95
Certain defendants appealed the district courts’ remand orders to the
United States Fifth Circuit.96 After a case is removed from state to
federal court, a federal district court order remanding the case is
generally not appealable.97 But when a case is removed based on
federal officer removal, a remand order is appealable.98 The
defendants in the coastal land loss case appealed the district court’s
second remand to the United States Fifth Circuit, but the appellate
court affirmed.99 The Fifth Circuit concluded that the thirty-day
deadline to remove ran from the date the original petition was served,
not from the time the expert report was submitted.100 Therefore, the
defendants’ second removal was not timely.101

94. Par. of Cameron v. Auster Oil & Gas Inc., 420 F. Supp. 3d 532, 539 (W.D.
La. 2019), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020).
95. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 2019 WL 2271118, at *7 (E.D.
La.), aff’d, 969 F.3d 502 (5th Cir. 2020).
96. Par. of Plaquemines v. Chevron USA, Inc., 969 F.3d 502, 504 (5th Cir.
2020).
97. Id. at 506.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 506–7.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 507.

